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We propose a general scenario to analyze social and eco-
nomic changes in modern environments. We illustrate the
ideas with a model that incorporating the main trends is sim-
ple enough to extract analytical results and, at the same time,
sufficiently complex to display a rich dynamic behavior. Our
study shows that there exists a macroscopic observable that
is maximized in a regime where the system is critical, in the
sense that the distribution of events follow power-laws. Com-
puter simulations show that, in addition, the system always
self-organizes to achieve the optimal performance in the sta-
tionary state.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 05.65.+b, 87.23.Kg, 45.70.Ht
The evolution of socio-economic environments is at-
tracting the interest of the physics community due to
the inherent complexity of many dynamic processes. In
particular, concepts and tools widely used in nonequilib-
rium statistical physics have proved to be quite useful
when studying the complex behavior of interacting eco-
nomic agents [1–3].
There are clear evidences that social and economic
change in modern societies typically come in “waves”
with seemingly little intertemporal structure. There are
many factors that can contribute to such complex evolu-
tion but, in essence, any theory able to account for the
inherent dynamics of the phenomenon should consider
how the stimulus for change spreads by gradual local
interaction through a social network as well as the in-
centives that govern individual behavior [4–7]. The hope
is that, independently of the particular choice for the
microscopic rules describing the dynamic behavior of the
agents that form an arbitrary system, one should observe
some collective trends that could be reflected in terms of
macroscopic observables.
In this Letter, our main goal is to define a general
scenario that could be useful to understand evolution in
socio-economic environments and within such a broad
field our concern is related to technological progress. In a
general sense, let us consider a population of agents each
of them interacting with a group of neighbors in order
to carry out projects of mutual interest. From these col-
laborations agents obtain payoffs which, of course, tend
individually to be as large as possible. To be more pre-
cise these payoffs should reflect several basic properties.
First, they should account for a basic benefit obtained
just for having a certain technological level. It might
be thought as an index for the technological potential
productivity. It is reasonable to assume that the higher
the technological level the larger the base payoff will be.
Furthermore, it should measure how similar the tools re-
quired to undertake a mutual project are. It should favor
those collaborations where both technological levels are
very similar (high compatibility) and punish any waste
of resources derived from a possible mismatch between
them. In other words, technological compatibility should
induce high values of the payoff function while signifi-
cant costs should arise from any degree of incompatibil-
ity [8]. It is also reasonable to assume that those costs
are bounded from below (the bankrupt).
The dynamics must be consequent with the aforemen-
tioned basic trends. Two main ingredients contribute to
the dynamical evolution. One is the interaction with the
rest of the population. Each agent should have the pos-
sibility to modify her technological level if the benefits
derived from this change are increased. With only this
term the system might reach a quiescent state where all
the agents are happy with their respective technological
level, not necessarily the same for all of them. To com-
plete the picture, it is also natural to think of individual
mechanisms of technological improvement which could
be modeled as a sudden update of the state of a given
agent. This change plays the role of a perturbation and
admits several interpretations (e.g. local innovation, a
shock in payoffs, population renewal, etc.). Immediately,
her nearest neighbors check whether an update to a new
technological state is more profitable for them. The pro-
cess can be extended all over the network triggering a
wave of change or avalanche till a new quiescent state is
reached. Then, the sequence of events is repeated again.
Notice that in modern socio-economic environments, the
diffusion of information/technology is usually a fast pro-
cess while advances are developed in a much slower time
scale. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both pro-
cesses are defined in different time scales. Other ingredi-
ents can also be incorporated into this general framework
but, up to now, let us keep this simple picture in mind.
Next point concerns the characterization of progress.
More precisely, we need to measure things in terms of
a macroscopic observable. Accounting for the rate of
advance, the most natural choice is the mean velocity of
progress, which can be defined as
ρ =
< H(t) >
< s(t) >
, (1)
1
where s is the number of agents involved in one of these
avalanches and H is the total advance induced by the
wave on the whole population. Brackets denote average
over time. Assuming that each individual update induces
a certain cost, ρ also measures the total cost needed to
reach a certain global (averaged) technological level. For
instance, a high advance rate will imply to achieve some
given level at minimum total cost, i.e. with the minimal
number of individual updates.
Several questions arise in a natural manner. For a
given system defined in such scenario, is there any kind
of behavior which could optimize ρ?. If this is the case,
how does the system evolve towards the optimal state?.
Let us steer the intuition of the reader with a phys-
ical discussion on the basis of the scenario proposed so
far. If the cost of an update is very small, then all agents
are willing to adopt the best available technology and any
new particular improvement will immediately be diffused
through the whole population, leading to an avalanche
involving a large number of individuals, eventually the
whole system. In contrast, in the opposite case it is gen-
erally difficult to find an agent interested in changing her
current state since even if a rather advanced technology is
available, the cost will typically be too high leading to a
situation where avalanches tend to be very small. These
two extreme situations can be identified with a supercrit-
ical or subcritical regime, respectively. In both cases the
advance rate defined in (1) tends to be independent of
the number of agents n. From a theoretical standpoint
one might expect that in the intermediate range the most
interesting phenomena can emerge since it is where rich
dynamic behavior may flourish. In this regime, we expect
that a substantial degree of heterogeneity (but one that
can be eventually broken by the advance of technological
avalanches) plays a fundamental role.
Once one knows the distribution of s and H then it is
straightforward to work out ρ and determine if there is
any specific regime where the performance of a given sys-
tem is optimal. There are plenty of evidences reported in
the literature showing that quantities like s and H follow
power law distributions [1,9–15]. Therefore, we assume
that the avalanche-size distribution obeys a power law
P (s) ∼ 1/sγ , for some γ > 0, as well as the distribution of
technological advances per avalanche P (H) ∼ 1/Hβ for
some positive β. In addition, we take the natural assump-
tion of considering that avalanche sizes and induced ad-
vances should also be related, on average, through some
power relationship of the form:
H ∼ sα (2)
with α ≥ 1. Notice that the lower bond α = 1 cor-
responds to the two aforementioned extreme situations:
either a uniform growing front (supercritical) or hardly
interacting agents (subcritical). It can be easily shown
that, provided γ and β are larger than 1, the following
relation should hold among the exponents [10]:
α =
γ − 1
β − 1
. (3)
It is also straightforward to find that the rate of techno-
logical progress is
ρ =
2− γ
α− γ + 1
n1+α−γ − 1
n2−γ − 1
, (4)
where n is the size of the system (number of agents). For
large n, three different regimes can be considered:
A) γ < 2:
ρ =
2− γ
α− γ + 1
nα−1,
B) 2 < γ < α+ 1:
ρ =
γ − 2
α− γ + 1
nα+1−γ ,
C) γ > α+ 1:
ρ =
γ − 2
γ − α− 1
.
Several conclusions can be extracted from these ex-
pressions. First, notice that there are two regimes where
the rate of technological advance increases with the size
of the system which suggests that large economic ensem-
bles enjoy beneficial ”scale effects”, i.e. large economies
grow faster. It is in these regions where one could expect
an optimal advance rate and therefore an optimal collec-
tive performance. In contrast, there is another regime
where ρ is independent of n suggesting a poorer cooper-
ative dynamics.
Let us illustrate the general scenario by proposing a
particular model endowed with the essential features re-
quested in the introduction. In this way we can investi-
gate how the distribution of technological advances de-
pends on microscopic details of the dynamics. In order
to enhance transparency we have reduced the complexity
of the model as much as possible. We have considered a
system formed by a population of n agents defined on a
periodic 1D geometry and nearest neighbor interactions.
Each agent is characterized by a positive real variable
ai(t) identified as the technological level. The interac-
tion with the neighbors is evaluated in terms of the payoff
function that we have chosen to be
ψ(a, a′) =
{
a− k1(1− e
−(a−a′)) if a > a′
a− k2(1− e
−(a′−a)) if a < a′
. (5)
Thus, the base payoff obtained from using a certain tech-
nology is assumed equal to a while the incompatibility
costs resulting from being too advanced or too backwards
relative to neighbors are parametrized, respectively, by
positive factors k1 and k2. However, as we will see later,
the overall properties of the system only depend on the
difference k = k1 − k2.
2
The dynamics of the model has two main components.
At each time step a randomly selected agent is cho-
sen to update her technological level from ai(t − 1) to
ai(t) = ai(t − 1) + σ˜i(t) where σ˜i(t) is a i.i.d. random
variable. The j = i ± 1 agent now has three options:
either to maintain her level or to adopt the level of one
of her two neighbors. She is assumed to take that action
a = {aj, aj−1, aj+1}, which maximizes her total payoff
ψ(a, aj−1)+ψ(a, aj+1) [16]. This process continues until
no agent wants to perform any adjustment in her techno-
logical level. Then, again one agent is updated randomly
and so on.
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FIG. 1. Logarithm of the probability of having an
avalanche of size s vs. logarithm of the size s, for different
values of k = k1 − k2. The length of the system is kept fixed
at n = 4096. For k = 2 only events of size n are observed.
Three different regimes are clearly observed in simu-
lations. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of avalanches for
different values of the parameter k. As we expected, be-
low a certain critical value all the avalanches are of the
size of the system. The technology advances at unison
like a uniform front. Any perturbation in the system due
to innovations is incorporated immediately by the rest
of agents because the cost of the update is very small.
In the opposite situation, i.e for large k, the avalanches
are of small size. In the limit k → ∞ the agents behave
independently and hence avalanches are of size one; this
corresponds to the random deposition model well known
in surface growth [17]. For intermediate values of the cou-
pling parameter the distribution of avalanches follows a
power law for several orders of magnitude of avalanche
sizes. Therefore, in this regime there is a clear absence
of time as well as length scales typical of a critical state
[9,10].
A deeper analysis of the model shows that it is possi-
ble to extract analytical information about the location
of the supercritical regime. In particular, by only using
local arguments, it is straightforward to show that if the
difference in technological level between two neighboring
sites of a given agent i, denoted by ∆ = ‖ai+1 − ai−1‖,
satisfies
k ≡ k1 − k2 < k
∗(∆) ≡
2∆
1− e−∆
, (6)
then agent i will always choose the highest local tech-
nological level which in its turn can trigger additional
updates in neighboring sites [16]. In our case, where per-
turbations are assumed uniformly random distributed in
the interval [0,1] and consequently the difference between
agents is a continuous variable, when k ≤ k∗(0) = 2 any
local inhomogenenity cannot be sustained and the system
achieves a global synchronized state where the technolog-
ical level of all the agents is exactly the same.
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FIG. 2. Time evolution of ρ as a function of k. The number
of updates, T , accounts for the slow time-scale. The system
size is kept fixed at n=512. The result is an average over 100
independent runs.
Now, let us consider the evolution of the macroscopic
observable ρ. Fig. 2 shows the time evolution of ρ for
different values of k and a fixed system size n = 512,
whereas Fig. 3 displays the stationary (long-run) values
of ρ for different values of k and different system sizes.
Two important and appealing features must be singled
out here. First, Fig. 2 shows that ρ grows monotonically
over time, the system self-organizes to achieve, for each k
the best associated performance. No matter what is the
initial condition the system evolves to maximize the ad-
vance rate. This quantity is maximal when the stationary
state is reached. As far as we know, this is the first model
where critical behavior is attained through a process of
self-organization that maximizes a certain macroscopic
observable. Second, Fig. 3 indicates that ρ is maximized
within the critical region, at a point located on its “lower
edge” [18] (i.e. within the narrow range where k ∈ [3, 4]).
Notice that in the two limit cases k ≤ 2 and k → ∞,
H ≈ s and therefore ρ is equal to the expected value of
3
the external random perturbation, 0.5 in our case. Fur-
thermore, these figures clearly show that the advance rate
depends positively on the number of agents, n, stressing
again the faster growth of large economies. This fact is
the motivation to investigate also if the model presented
in this work accomplishes the relationship between expo-
nents predicted in the general scenario. We have indeed
confirmed that the scaling relation (3) is fulfilled within
numerical accuracy, by fitting straight lines to the wide
region where power-laws are observed [16].
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FIG. 3. Advance rate as a function of k, in a log-log scale,
for three different values of the length. For each run we have
generated 64∗n avalanches and averaged over 10 independent
realizations of the noise, except for n = 2048 where only two
independent realizations have been considered.
In conclusion, we have presented here a general sce-
nario for the study of evolution in socio-economic en-
vironments putting special attention on the subject of
technological progress. It is quite appealing to realize
that in a very general manner the framework described
in this Letter is able to predict the existence of different
regimes depending on the cost associated to the improve-
ment/diffussion of technology and that these regimes
can be computed directly from a macroscopic quantity
without specifying details about the underlying micro-
scopic dynamics and payoff functions. Even more, we
have shown through a simple model that critical behav-
ior is attained in a natural way through a process of self-
organization that maximizes a macroscopic observable:
the advance rate.
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